Standar Autentikasi Ekstrateritorial dan Chain of Custody: Validitas Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) sebagai Alat Bukti dalam Hukum Acara Mahkamah Pidana Internasional (ICC)

Abstract

Modern armed conflicts increasingly generate evidence of war crimes and genocide from open sources, namely amateur videos on social media, satellite imagery, and digital traces documented by civilians. The International Criminal Court has begun relying on such open-source intelligence, most notably in the Al-Werfalli arrest warrant, which was the first to rest largely on social media footage. Yet the Rome Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not comprehensively regulate standards for purely digital evidence; they establish a free system of evidentiary assessment that is flexible on admissibility but silent on authentication. This article analyses the validity of open-source intelligence as evidence in ICC procedure and the extraterritorial authentication and digital chain-of-custody standards it demands, then examines how the Court should adapt its evidentiary procedure to verify deepfakes and protect the accused's fair trial rights amid a flood of digital misinformation. Using a normative juridical method with statutory, case, conceptual, and comparative approaches, the article argues that the Court must operationalise emerging standards such as the Berkeley Protocol, establish provenance documentation and hash-verification protocols, build digital forensic capacity and deepfake-detection procedures, and safeguard equality of arms, so that the evidentiary weight of open-source material rests on verifiable provenance rather than apparent persuasiveness.